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                      The Global Financial Meltdown and Financial Regulation: 
Shirking and Learning -- Canada in an International Context∗ 
 
Stephen L. Harris 
School of Public Policy and Administration 







The overarching mission of prudential regulators of financial services is “to preserve a 
safe and sound financial system.” This is a widely accepted yet simple and 
straightforward objective. The meltdown in global financial markets began in early 2007, 
but reached crisis proportions in September 2008. It is the assertion in this paper that at 
the global systemic level, the financial catastrophe can plainly be attributed to the 
phenomenon of “shirking.”i In short, those responsible for preserving a safe and sound 
financial system did not do their jobs effectively. Another factor contributing not only to 
the crisis itself, but also to its severity, was the absence of policy learningii by key global 
state actors. Government policy actors, the regulators and central bankers in the industrial 
democracies, learned little it seems from the earlier episodes of global financial calamity 
caused by the imprudent behavior of private actors and institutions they are authorized to 
oversee. Financial safety and soundness was not protected. This was a crisis that surely 
did not have to occur. 
 
In addition, the scope of responsibility for the global economic and financial collapse 
extends to risk committees of boards of directors of financial institutions who feigned 
knowledge of what they in fact did not know, and to CEOs and COOs whose ignorance 
of the complex instruments their financial engineers were fashioning approached gross 
negligence. The regulators and private non-government actors  – particularly those in the 
US, the UK, in Iceland and a number of countries in continental Europe, and in Asia and 
Canada as well can be assumed guilty of not adequately protecting the financial system 
from calamity. It is not simply that these actors shirked – they can be accused of creating 
a reality for themselves about how financial markets behave – a reality which turned out 
to be absolutely incorrect. 
 
In Canada, the impact of the global meltdown was less severe than it was in virtually 
every other industrial democracy. This appears due to the more conservative management 
practices in the country’s largest banks and to a lesser extent to the character of aggregate 
                                                 
∗ Work on this paper began during the winter term 2009 while I was a visiting scholar at 
the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. I am grateful Jan 
Svejnar, and the staff of the International Policy Center for the support provided. I also 
want to acknowledge the useful comments by Bruce Doern on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
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prudential oversight. However, there were a number of episodes that did threaten 
financial instability in the country. The collapse of the asset-back commercial paper 
(ABCP) market represents the most serious one and was accompanied by the Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) denying any culpability for the 
market’s collapse despite OSFIs overarching mission.iii Two commercial banks had to 
raise additional capital to meet OSFI requirements and the Bank of Canada’s provision of 
extraordinary liquidity to the money market peaked at $37 billion in late 2008 to prevent 
it from totally seizing up and causing further damage to the economy. The provision of 
liquidity continues but at more modest levels and at the end of October stood about $28 
billion.iv In addition, the Minister of Finance directed the Canada Housing and Mortgage 
Corporation (CMHC) to buy mortgages from the chartered banks to supplement their 
liquidity positions. Purchases have totaled about $60 billion of the $125 billion 
authorized by the Minister of Finance.v 
 
It is important to determine why Canada fared better than most other countries since 
2007. Is Canada’s performance attributable to measurably better prudential supervision or 
is it attributable to better management in the financial services industry? Or some 
combination of both? At the global we will want to explore whether past financial 
calamities have informed regulators’ activities, ex ante. 
 
A good deal of the public discourse has focused on how the crisis manifested itself – 
crudely characterized by greed and irresponsibility by private non-state actors. On the 
other hand, public statements of key government actors claim to understand why the 
meltdown occurred and have sought to assure observers that each of them was carrying 
out their respective responsibilities -- but check with the other actors because perhaps 
they were at fault, or that market participants behaved in unexpected ways, or it was 
really someone else’s responsibility.  Everyone claims to have done his or her job. The 
purpose of this project is first to validate the hypothesis of shirking: did those with an 
official role in this debacle in fact carry out their responsibilities – globally and in 
Canada? And, second, to explore the extent of policy learning from previous national and 
global systemic crises. 
 
The chapter will proceed as follows: the first section will provide an explanation of the 
role of the state in prudential supervision of the financial services industry; the second 
section will provide a stylized exposition of how the global financial meltdown 
materialized; the third section will analyze the Canada’s ABCP crisis and the regulatory 
response; the fourth section will explore the phenomenon of “policy learning” in finance; 
and, the final section will provide some conclusions. 
 
 
THE CHANGING FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE STATE 
 
The structure of global finance has changed over the past 25 – 30 years in large part 
because of the commingling of traditional banking, investment banking and insurance 
which over time gave rise to financial mega-institutions in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Commingling – or one stop financial shopping – began and evolved into a well-
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established practice in continental Europe. There were benefits for both the users of 
financial services and the owners (shareholders) and employees of the industry. There 
was clearly an incentive for the segmented industry in North America and the UK to 
strive for the more efficient model. Furthermore, the establishment of mono-line financial 
service providers whose sole business was the issuance of credit cards, or mortgage 
lenders and/or originators whose primary focus was the residential market, served to 
change the competitive environment in finance – particularly in the United States. 
 
While there were risks associated with this new structure: power concentration, market 
concentration, conflicts of interest, etc… regulations at the global level recognized these 
risks and responded with new institutional structures. For example the UK established the 
Financial Services Authority, the Australians established a new prudential regulator and a 
securities commission, OSFI was established in Canada, and the US introduced strict 
accountability and reporting standards (corporate governance) for all public companies. 
In addition, regulators, central bankers and treasury officials convened at frequent 
intervals under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the 
Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board),vi the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and the World Economic Forum (WEF) to review economic and financial 
stability issues.  
 
The establishment of the mono-line institutions precipitated a commoditization of 
finance, which underpinned the whole financial crisis.  Commoditization in finance is the 
situation where the street level originators of loans, led by the mono-lines and as well 
adopted by some traditional financial institutions, immediately sell these assets in the 
market with no intention of establishing a relationship with the borrower. The 
profitability of these transactions is based on both the loan origination fees and the 
interest rate spreads on the subsequent sale of the loans. The historic “relationship 
banking” paradigm now was not part of the marketing strategy of this “new financial 
services” model. Institutional activities were focused on the “bottom line” and so-called 
“shareholder value,” and on compensation rewards for activities that increase shareholder 
value. It is fair to say that the public interest was not on the radar screen. 
  
This commoditization gave rise to innovations facilitating the transformation of high 
yielding and highly risky assets (mortgage loans and credit card receivables) into 
complex above average yielding financial market instruments -- sold mainly to 
institutional investors. This complexity was clearly not understood by the regulators,vii 
risk committees, ratings agencies and importantly the ultimate investors whose risk 
taking during and after the crisis was subsequently underwritten by the state – or more 
accurately the taxpayers.  
  
The commoditization of financial services phenomenon and the rise of instrument 
complexity were not accompanied by parallel regulatory developments within states. The 
riskiness of the “originate to sell” phenomenon was all but ignored in the US and global 
investors who subsequently purchased the resulting derivative instruments were 
insufficiently familiar with evolving institutional-client autonomy to introduce the 
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appropriate risk calculus into their investment decisions. The US institutions who bought 
these instruments from the originators did not undertake adequate due diligence because 
their primary goal was to sell them in short order. In addition, the ratings agencies gave 
comfort to investors in these highly risky and misunderstood assets by assigning 
investment grade assessments to them. Ultimate investor comfort was provided by default 
insurance (known as credit default swaps) on these instruments sold by such institutions 
as the American International Group (AIG) in the United States. It is clear in retrospect 
that AIG did not understand what they were insuring and so the cost of the default risk 
insurance was low – reflecting everyone’s assessment of the low probability of default. 
However, bank capital was indeed exposed. 
 
It is important to note that while Canada was not caught up in the severity of the collapse 
in the fall of 2008, its financial services industry was not exempt from the global 
negligent behavior that has already been discussed. Canadian banks and non-bank entities 
began to repackage similar cash generating assets into short-term instruments. The total 
size of the market in Canada was about $116 billionviii before the global financial 
collapse and the chartered banks had originated some 75 percent of the ix total.   
 
Globally, regulators, ex post, were diligent in explaining what they are particularly 
responsible for and how the crisis emerged, but have been unable to adequately explain, 
ex ante, why they were unable to stem the activities that would ultimately debilitate 
global finance and wreak havoc in the global economy. Part of the explanation of course 
is structure of power in the industrial democracies and part is information asymmetries. If 
the state was acting in the public interest, then those who had the power to at least flag 
the risks should have been using their leadership positions to arrest the imprudent 
behavior.  
 
As will be explained below, implicitly the state was acting at the behest of finance and 
not of the public interest. And, while the words of the regulators suggest support for safe 
and sound financial system their deeds did not provide compelling evidence that this was 
their objective. Regulators at the global level did not adjust their practices to fully 
account for the riskiness and complexity associated with this new financial structure. 
 
 
A STYLIZED VIEW OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWN IN THE U.S. 
 
There were a number of crosscurrents at work in the US economy which caused the germ 
of imprudent behavior to spread like a virus around the globe. First, there was a glut of 
global savings in the world economy that caused longer- term interest rates to fall to 
historic low levels. Among other activities, this precipitated strong demand for both 
residential property and mortgage financing and refinancing. This strong demand fuelled 
a bubble in housing prices. Because Americans viewed the resulting increase in house 
equity as a source of spending power, many mortgages were refinanced at prevailing 
lower interest rates. This allowed Americans to purchase all kinds of goods from offshore 
-- particularly from China and elsewhere in Asia – which exacerbated the US current 
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account deficit and contributed to another set of global financial troubles that continue to 
percolate. 
 
Second, home ownership was an important public policy objective in the US, facilitated 
not only by the favorable personal income tax treatment on mortgage interest, but also by 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) which was designed to encourage, among other 
financial services, the provision of mortgages in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods.x In the case of the refinancing of existing mortgages, the financing of 
new home purchases and CRA-facilitated home financing, the mono-line mortgage 
originators captured an increasing share of the mortgage financing business by providing 
credit to borrowers who clearly did not have the resources to carry the liability they were 
taking on. As has been widely reported, moreover, many borrowers did not understand 
the terms of the mortgage instrument itself. These individuals were known in the market 
as NINJAs (no income, no job, no assets) – or subprime borrowers. By late 2007, the 
number of outstanding subprime mortgage loans totaled some 8 million, or about 15 
percent of the overall mortgage market.xi 
 
Third, the clear risks and potential carnage associated with the subprime mortgage 
lending activities were well know by the principal banking and financial regulator – the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Indeed, as early as 2000, the late Ned 
Gramlich, a Governor of the Fed, proposed to the central bank Chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, more intensive oversight of the institutions involved in subprime lending. 
However, the proposal never went to the full Board after it had been submitted to 
Greenspan.xii Some seven years later, only days before he passed away and a year before 
the US financial system virtually collapsed, Gramlich set out a plan to fix the percolating 
subprime crisis.xiii It too fell on deaf ears. This is a rare example of what Bachrach and 
Baratz identified as a non-decision – “the practice of limiting the scope of actual 
decision-making to  ‘safe’ issues by manipulating the dominant community values, 
myths, and political institutions and procedures.”xiv The structure of power in finance 
prevented the Fed from tightening regulation to dampen the market’s enthusiasm for what 
was thought to be high yielding but low risk investments because Greenspan first did not 
think the market would act to its own detriment and second he feared a backlash against 
the Fed in the Congress and the Administrationxv -- even though the central bank is 
assumed to be “independent” of political influence. 
 
Fourth, the originate-to-distribute culture that permeated American finance contributed to 
the spreading of the subprime virus around the world. The originators of the subprime 
mortgages because they had no intention of keeping these assets on their books failed to 
undertake the typical due diligence in which lenders engage before approving a loan. 
These loans were subsequently offloaded to commercial and investment bankers who 
sliced and diced these mortgages (creating so-called derivative instruments) and then sold 
them to investors around the world. These derivative instruments were attractive to global 
investors because their yields were relatively high in a world with a glut of savings and 
low long-term interest rates. 
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Fifth, in addition to the high yield on these derivatives, demand was also fuelled by the 
decision of the bond ratings agencies to give these instruments an investment grade 
evaluation. Moreover, these instruments had the names of JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, 
Goldman etc… associated with them in addition to the insurance provided by AIG. 
Because of the names and default insurance, investors assumed there was little to no risk 





CANADA’S SUBPRIME CRISIS: THE ABCP MELTDOWN 
 
The global financial meltdown has clearly had less impact on the Canadian institutional 
structure than was experienced in most of the other industrialized democracies – although 
the “real” economy has clearly been negatively impacted. The popular press has heaped 
praise on the Canadian regulatory system as being the “best” in the world – and the 
chartered banks being among the strongest, safest and best managed.xvi Current and 
former elected officials have taken credit for this state of affairs despite their own policy 
actions that did little to nurture the Canadian financial services industry as national 
champions. Indeed, “bank bashing” was a national sport not many years ago when there 
were moves afoot in the industry to consolidate.xvii 
 
The fact that our banks avoided the full consequences of the meltdown is unmistakable. 
The cause of this state of affairs is less clear. It could be because of the regulatory system 
is robust; it could be that the culture of the key actors in the industry is more 
conservative/risk averse than experienced in other jurisdictions; or it may just have been 
fortuitous. In this regard it is useful to explore the collapse of the ABCP market in the 
summer of 2007 to provide some insight and understanding about the character of 
Canada’s oversight regime.  
 
In August 2007 the Canadian ABCP market seized-up because issuers of this paper could 
not rollover their maturing liabilities into newly issued paper. The confidence squeeze in 
this market was clearly attributable to the problems in the US subprime and banking 
markets. The uncertainty was such that the typical market operators withdrew from the 
market and simply parked their funds until the air cleared and special liquidity facilities 
were established by the key global central banks. This event, however, underscored 
serious shortcomings in the Canadian regulatory regime – including its fractured nature, 
which appeared to inhibit proper communication among the key regulators and a clear 
reluctance of the key state actors to take the lead to preserve a safe and sound system. 
Officialdom, at both the federal and provincial levels performed their functions in a 
balkanized structure that resulted in no one working to preserve a safe and sound 
financial system. Some $32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP effectively defaulted 
leaving both sophisticated institutional investors and individuals at the mercy of a 
restructuring process designed not to make them whole, but to preserve the legitimacy of 
the public authorities that failed to carry out their responsibilities. Most of the paper was 
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in the form of credit default swaps (CDS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), and 
consumer and mortgage receivables. 
 
The ABCP crisis in Canada had similar characteristics as the subprime mortgage 
catastrophe in the US. First, it was rooted in the phenomenon of “originate to distribute” 
discussed above. This characteristic undermined the due diligence in which lenders and 
borrowers traditionally engaged before consummating a “deal.” The sponsors of the 
organizations established to distribute this paper were known as conduits.xviii This paper 
typically had terms to maturity of money market instruments – less than one year. The 
conduits used the proceeds of the sale of their paper to purchase additional assets from 
originators  -- mortgages, household sector loans including credit card receivables, 
commercial leases, CDSs and CDOs. The underlying assets clearly had a longer term to 
maturity than the liability used to acquire them. This mismatch was not unlike other term-
to-maturity mismatches that characterized many financial crises during the latter part of 
the 20th century. 
 
Second, investors’ understanding of the ABCP instruments was as opaque as the 
underlying assets in the US subprime paper crisis. Importantly, the Provincial Securities 
Administrators (PSAs) did not require a prospectus for the issuers of ABCP because there 
was a legal exemption for “knowledgeable” investors, although collectively they had the 
power to require one. It is probably the case that the Administrators themselves did not 
understand the inherent risks in these instruments – particularly the CDSs – and therefore 
failed to properly protect both institutional and individual investors.xix  As it turned out 
the ABCP “was not the type of investment that many holders appear to have imagined”xx 
they were. 
 
Third, it was not only the PSAs who failed to understand, ex ante, the underlying 
problems in the ABCP market. The Bank of Canada, whose implicit responsibilities 
extend to assessing and reporting upon systemic financial stability, ex post, was able to 
effectively point to all the market anomalies that gave rise to the observed disruptions 
generally, but failed to wave the “red flag” before authorities had to intervene and give 
life to moral hazard.xxi Henri-Paul Rousseau, CEO of the Caisse de Dépôt et placement 
du Québec noted in testimony before the provincial legislature's public finance committee 
that “There was some thinking out there that this was very risky. We thought it was not 
plausible and it happened. That's it.”xxii  
 
The real problem is that very few people responsible for prudential oversight and 
systemic stability understood what was taking place, ex ante. Indeed, in June 2007, the 
Bank’s Financial System Review stated: “our assessment is that the Canadian financial 
system is sound and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.”xxiii The purpose in 
highlighting this point is to demonstrate the extent of the ignorance of the risks 
percolating in the Canadian financial system, rather than to point the finger of blame at 
the central bank for the events that ultimately materialized. Admittedly, the Bank on a 
number of occasions leading up to the ABCP fiasco and the global turmoil more 
generally, had pointed to the fact that financial risk had been under-priced. All 
“regulators” however, failed to implement measures that would have quashed this 
imprudent behavior by market participants before harm was done. Regulators were not 
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regulating, they were observing. Society would have been better served if the market 
innovations had been better understood – or even removed from the market place until 
proper transparency and comprehension had been achieved.  
 
Fourth, while David Dodge absolved the ratings agencies for providing comfort to 
investors in the ABCP debacle,xxiv it is obvious that the Dominion Bond Rating Service 
(DBRS) did not fully understand these structured instruments. If they had fully 
understood the liquidity and market risk associated with them they would not have been 
evaluated in a manner that would have so easily enticed investors into them. This 
assertion can be interpreted as an oversimplification. However, the Bank’s defense of 
these agencies essentially calls for the status quo in respect of the oversight of the work 
of these actors.xxv The Bank’s conclusion, while suggesting that the rating agencies have 
erred in the past concludes on balance that they have done a good job as measured by 
their ability to properly predict “actual default experience.”xxvi This is certainly a 
problematic conclusion.  
 
Fifth, as discussed above, the problems associated with the “originate-to-distribute” or 
“acquire-to-distribute” phenomena have contributed to financial instruments being put on 
the market by financial institutions to unsuspecting investors as prudent investment 
vehicles. It would to be unfair to accuse institutions of a conspiring to sell risky assets as 
safe assets. However, because of the ignorance associated with so-called innovations in 
financial markets both individuals and institutional investors have been lulled into 
complacency by relying on expert opinion -- which in hindsight was not expert at all.  
The historical rule of “know your client” is not as important as it once was even when the 
client is a state sponsored investment fund or an institutional investor. The public interest 
has not been well served a consequence. 
 
Sixth, the key actor regulating financial institutions in Canada, OSFI, was really an 
observer of the ABCP meltdown. Indeed, the Superintendent stated publicly that it was 
not her role to tell investors what to do. While the technical correctness of this statement 
cannot be debated, it is fair to speculate why a senior bureaucrat, with the key 
responsibility of preserving a safe and sound financial system did not use her bully-pulpit 
to warn investors of the imprudence of the ABCP venture. The Superintendent has built a 
wall around OSFIs responsibilities and took little initiative while the crisis was 
percolating to step up to warn the market of the risks associated with these ABCP 
instruments. Indeed, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act 
requires OSFI “to monitor and evaluate system-wide or sectoral events and procedures 
that may have a negative impact on the financial condition of financial institutions.”xxvii 
The Superintendent clearly did not do this. 
 
In testimony before the House of Commons Finance Committee, responding to questions 
the sluggishness of OSFIs response to the emerging ABCP problems, the Superintendent 
stated:  “It's not a market that we oversee. We've spoken in the past about the kind of 
work we do, which is focused solely on bank safety and soundness. We would put 
investor alerts on our website if we saw someone saying it was a bank and taking money 
from Canadians when it's not really a bank. There would be an investor alert on that. But 
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when you're talking about asset-backed commercial paper and the fact that the market 
was different from what existed elsewhere, we would look more to other agencies that 
have responsibility for investor protection.” The Superintendent also failed to convince 
Parliamentarians that OSFI understood the complexities of the ABCP market by shifting 
blame to the institutions that created them: “First of all, it's the institutions that have to 
say whether they're understanding it or not. One institution can say they don't understand 
it and another can say they understand it completely…This is what institutions are doing 
around the world. We need to be able to compete. We would see the boards of directors, 
we would do reviews of what we were seeing, and we would be explaining to the boards 
that it is their responsibility to know what they're doing…”xxviii  
 
 
The Bank of Canada, appearing before the same Committee and responding to a question 
about the role of the ratings agencies in providing false comfort to investors, Deputy 
Governor Pierre Duguay noted: “Obviously, we are not directly responsible for ratings 
agencies. Generally speaking, as regards the commercial paper crisis, there were 
problems with ratings agencies. Commercial paper was greatly lacking in transparency. 
Certain structured products were very opaque, and few people knew what they truly 
were. Ratings agencies were specifically assessing what we call credit risk, and not 
liquidity. After the losses, investors who were buying up ABCP like hot cakes suddenly 
decided that they did not want any of it anymore.” 
 
So those responsible for a safe and sound financial system claimed no responsibility for 
the collapse. Obviously, this is not good enough. 
 
Seventh, with a multi-agency regulatory system at the federal level and dispersed 
securities regulation at the provincial level it is really unclear who speaks for the system 
as a whole. It is not the central bank (although it does provided a semi-annual assessment 
of the system’s stability), it is not OSFI (although OSFI does have the mandate to 
monitor system-wide activities), and it is not the provincial regulators. Indeed, this 
decentralized structure has allowed bureaucrats to avoid responsibility for ensuring a safe 
and sound financial system. There is no authority representing the interests of Canadians 
generally. Each institution defends its own interests while Canadians pick up the tab for 
errors or negligence.  
 
Eighth, despite the balkanization of the financial regulatory system in Canada there are a 
number of bureaucratic institutions designed to provide coherence to the objective of 
prudential oversight. At the federal level, the Financial Institutions Supervisory 
Committee (FISC) chaired by the OSFI Superintendent comprises, the Governor of the 
Bank of Canada, the Chairman of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Deputy 
Minister of Finance, and the Commissioner of the Financial Consumer Agency. In 
addition the Minister of Finance indicated that the Canadian Securities Regulator, 
contingent on the establishment of a single securities market regulator, would also be a 
member of this coordinating committee.xxix  
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The Minister, in a speech in August 2009, identified the work and the composition of the 
FISC – but did not identify the Committee by its legal name, nor did he reaffirm that the 
OSFI Superintendent would continue as it Chair. The Minister did point out that “the 
Department of Finance…has the ultimate authority for the financial system and for all 
financial sector regulation and legislation. It is our job to ensure effective coordination of 
all of the pillars as well.”xxx However, no state actor yet speaks with legitimate authority 
to preserve a safe and sound financial system.  
 
So what can we conclude about regulatory and stability oversight. The central bank, 
responsible for assessing systemic stability clearly underestimated the risks to Canadian 
financial stability associated with offshore spillovers; the market regulators, because of 
their fractured character and the complexity of the instruments being sold in the market 
were unable to dampen the demand for financial instruments whose risk was clearly 
opaque; and the senior regulator, OSFI, simply washed its hands of the mess by telling 
Canadians it was someone else’s’ responsibility.xxxi  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the Conservative government attempted to introduce 
competition into the mortgage insurance business – a carryover of an initiative of the 
previous Liberal government, in its Budget 2006, by permitting zero down, 40-year 
mortgages and encouraging companies such as AIG to come to Canada to “help” increase 
home ownership in the country. The banks approved such loans. Thus, it was possible 
that the events in the US and Europe, partially, could have been replicated in Canada. 
Indeed in 2007 CMHC was on track to insure such mortgages – but for the intervention 
of David Dodge, then Governor of the Bank of Canada who criticized the proposal for a 
number of reasons. The proposal was ultimately dropped by the CMHC and such high-
risk mortgages legislatively banned by the government in June 2008.xxxii Governor 
Dodge was the only senior federal or provincial bureaucrat to step outside his direct 
sphere of responsibility and raise the red flag about imprudent lending practices. Other 
bureaucrats (and politicians) were quiet or suggested these matters were others’ 
responsibilities.  Dodge provided an important lesson to emulate for others involved in 
oversight activities. 









The banks in Canada have in recent memory not been respected as national champions. 
Ordinary citizens, following the lead of politicians at the national level, have taken ev
opportunity to “bash” the banks. The complaints have ranged from fees to withdraw 
funds from ATM machines unaffiliated with the customers’ bank; overcharging for cred
card balances; opaqueness of rules regarding loans and accounts; inadequately serving 
the SME sector; and generally not serving the needs of ordinary Canadians. This bank-
bashing phenomenon was behind the refusal of the Chretien-Martin administration to 
allow consolidation in the banking industry for purely political reasons; to prohibit c
pillar consolidation – particularly between banks and insurance companies; and by 
refusing to allow the banks to propose remedies to address the issues raised by the 
competition authorities when its report was issued on the bank merger question.xxxiii 
More recently, there has been renewed bashing of the banks as this time the Conservativ
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government is trying to eliminate the banks insurance offerings on the Internet. This is 
being undertaken at the behest of the Insurance Brokers Association.xxxiv As was the case 






 a much more prudent fashion than did their 






 are more 




Canadians were never told that the quality, choice and efficiency of the services pro
by Canadian banks far exceeded anything offered by their American and European 
counterparts.xxxv For example, in most European countries all one can do with an A
machine is withdraw cash. Customers cannot pay bills, or transfers funds between 
accounts, for example. And, with the exception of one or two institutions, Canadian 
banks did not manage their risk exposures in an imprudent fashion. It is for this reason 
that the Canadian banks were not sucked into the global financial meltdown. That is
recent historical pattern of action – the policies – pursued by Canadian banks. So if 
Canadian banks are on balance both prudent risk managers and service oriented -- ca
this behavior at all be related to their performance leading up to the meltdown. The 
answer is obvious and the evidence is displayed in Table Axxxvi below. Canadia
managed their capital positions in
c
 
Part of the explanation for the more robust capitalization of Canadian banks relative to 
their international counterparts is explained by the limits imposed by the OSFI on banks’
leverage (capital to asset) ratios. This ratio is limited to 20 times (assets can exceed non-
risk weighted capital by a factor of 20). This is about the same leverage ratio as in 
in the United States, but considerably less leveraged than institutions in the Euro- 
zone.xxxvii Internationally, “Canadian banks are generally seen as strong counterparties a
they tend to be more conservative …than many other banks.xxxviii Having said that, i
the case that there is not a lot to distinguish Tier 1 capital in Canada and the United 
States, although the quality of the capital in Canada is higher as measured by common
equity. And, North American banks are clearly better capitalized than their European 










POLICY LEARING IN FINANCE 
 
I reach the conclusion that the most recent financial crisis was in a fundamental sense not 
unlike earlier ones – only more severe. In the case of the Asian financial crisis, for 
example, traditional offshore bankers and dealers were lending to South Korea and to 
other South East Asian nations at interest rate spreads that clearly did not reflect the 
inherent risk.xl If the cost of borrowing does not reflect the inherent risk of the asset in 
question then default materializes.  This, in part is what happened during the evolution of 
the current crisis. The regulators were shirking in the late 1990s, as they were most 
recently, in the face of the inadequacy of the due diligence undertaken by the institutional 
actors.  
 
The Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis almost sank the global financial 
system because the Federal Reserve was unaware of the connected risks that LTCM had 
spread around the financial system. The Fed was of the view that any miscues by their 
large banks would only amount to “rounding errors.”xli That premise was clearly 
incorrect and the key actor responsible for the safety and soundness of the US financial 
system was asleep at the switch.  
 
In addition, the Nordic financial crisis, of the late 1980s and early 1990s occurred in the 
aftermath of a significant period of deregulation – when the banking system was 
permitted to participate in new household lending activity. The lesson here is that a 
nation cannot simply deregulate and hope that markets will behave.  
 
I have already explored how the US subprime crises and the ABCP fiasco in Canada can 
be laid at the doorstep of the regulatory community.  
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The obvious lesson: there is a need for regulators to learn from past financial crises in 
order to preserve a safe and sound financial system. Ex ante avoidance of a financial 
crisis would undoubtedly result in a welfare improvement vis-à-vis ex post bailouts and 
economic collapse. So how is it that what seems so obvious has not materialized?  
 
Part of the explanation lies in the structure of power in democratic capitalist countries. 
That is to say, finance can engage in risky imprudent behavior on the one hand and 
rightly assume that the state will bail them out somehow (a lesson reinforced by the 
dramatic fallout of the decision to permit the exit of Lehman Brothers) and on the other, 
coerce the state into supplying policies that are advantageous to finance. In crude terms, 
the power of information (the information asymmetry problem) clearly favors the 
institutions. And, only the institutions know if they will have to go to the state for a 
bailout (the adverse selection problem).  
 
Moreover, the states implicitly understand that if they get in the way of finance, with 
tough prudential regulations, the consequences for general economic performance may be 
harmful because finance is mobile. For example, this was the case of the deregulation of 
finance in the US following the 1960s growth of the Eurodollar market that wreaked 
havoc on New York as the world’s financial capital to the benefit of London. And, there 
are many other examples.xlii  
 
The poor record speaks for itself. Regulators are not up to the task of preserving a safe 
and sound financial system because of an unreasonable belief in the efficiency of 
markets. Canada was fortunate to have a conservative business and investment culture 
and thus the strength of the Canadian financial system has more to do with the private 
sector actors than it does with the quality of oversight. Unfortunately, the same cannot be 
stated for other jurisdictions. 
 
We seem to have entered a period in global finance where moral hazard is the accepted 
principle for large institutions. Nothing has occurred in Canada or elsewhere to put at rest 
the assumption that the state will ultimately step up with its unlimited resources to bail 
out imprudent risk taking. That has been the pattern of action since the 1980s and it 
continues as of this writing.xliii That is what private financial actors have learned; but 
public actors have not really changed their patterns of actions or learning skills. 
 
The policy response in the industrial democracies to the meltdown was to give life to 
moral hazard. The bank bailouts began in the UK with the $42 billion rescue of Northern 
Rock, spread to the UBS who needed $7 billion from the Swiss government, the purchase 
of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan in the US, the failure of Lehman Brothers which triggered 
the stock market meltdown in September 2008, the US government takeover of AIG, 
Dresdner Bank sold to Commerzbank by Allianz in Germany, Merrill Lynch acquired by 
Bank of America, IHBOS taken over by TBS in the UK with the help of a $21 billion 
bailout by the UK government, the failure of Washington Mutual and Wachovia – both 
essentially bailed out by the US government, Citigroup rescued by the state, Hypo Real 
Estate Bank went bust in Germany to the tune of $68 billion, AIG was taken over by the 
US government…and the story could go on. In Canada, the central bank and the CMHC 
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had to take extra-ordinary actions to deal with the ABCP crisis and the externalities of the 
global crisis.  
 
Generally, these actions are not the story of regulators doing their job, but of regulators 






The international response to the crisis is the story of shirking and the absence of 
learning. There have been proposals to restructure the international financial architecture; 
discipline market participants by regulating their compensation contracts; mitigate 
procyclicality regulation; create special rules for systemically important institutions; 
improve the IMF surveillance; change the name of the Financial Stability Forum and 
broaden its membership; formally create the G-20 institution to replace the G-7, partly. 
So far not much has occurred – except for the creation of the Financial Stability Board. 
The EU has attempted to strengthen the regulation of offshore ratings but the 
consequences are difficult to assess presently. In one from or another, this backward 
looking response has been tried before and it does not work. Rules cannot be fashioned 
for all potential risky activities. This is the clear lesson of the official meetings in Basle 
and Washington over past 30 years.  
 
Thus, this buffet of suggestions and/or initiatives to cure the frequent burdens financial 
crises in capitalism is not very helpful. The real requirement is to regulate the domestic 
regulators. Individual states must take measures to appoint regulators: who can speak 
truth to power; and, who are not fearful of raising the flag and calling a time out when the 
market is behaving in a fashion that cannot be easily understood. These powers already 
exist. They should have been used. And, proportionate penalties for those who instigate 
systemic meltdowns should provide an incentive for sober second thought before 
imprudent ideas turn to action.  
 
In Canada, for example, the penalties incurred by the institutions that “engaged in 
activities contrary to the public interest,”xliv  in the ABCP fiasco, amounted to only $140 
millionxlv – some .04 percent of the $32 billion “default”. This is clearly not a 
proportionate penalty and moreover no individuals have been held directly accountable. 
Moreover, unlike the public disgrace and incrimination that occurs in the US (and 
imprisonment at times), the deliberations by the Canadian regulatory authorities were 
held in camera. This is clearly a reflection of the power structure in Canada. 
 
In the Canadian case, the state did not incur any direct costs for the ABCP collapse 
although holders of the debt have incurred enormous costs – particularly the Caisse de 
Depot in Quebec and the City of Hamilton. The central bank and the CMHC have had to 
alter their lending and investment practices to deal with both the fallout of the ABCP and 
global financial crises while in a number of countries the state is now key shareholder in 
financial institutions (particularly the U.S. and U.K.). It seems unreasonable for the state 
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to act as the lender or owner of last resort without having an unequivocal opinion about 
the conditions under which an entity can borrow in credit markets. This is clearly not a 
responsibility that should be left to an unregulated actor (the ratings agency) who is 
accountable to the entity underwriting the cost of the rating. This should have been 
learned long ago. The situation in the US and UK are broadly similar – but solutions do 
not seem to be directed at the problem – but at absolving state actors for their shirking 
and ignorance. 
 
Activist regulators and central bankers will be vilified by the market but the costs of such 
vilification – both private and public -- will be less than the social costs incurred as a 
consequence of events under consideration here. There is no need for any grand 
reregulation plan at the country or the global level. There is a need for state actors to do 
nothing but reflect upon and act in the public interest. This is the learning that is required.  
In Canada, the current Governor has recently reflected on the household debt situation.xlvi 
There may be a time when the Governor’s bully pulpit will be inadequate to the task at 
hand. It may be that the central bank will have to use a long dormant tool of moral 
suasion – direct coercion of the credit grantors to change their lending practices or 
activities. It is this direct incursion that is required not only in Canada, but also globally. 
Markets make mistakes, as Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and Mervyn King have 
belatedly admitted and it is the role of the state to preserve safety and soundness. 
Subtleness to this end just does not work. 
 
Prudential regulators should be placed in the same position. If financial market activities 
seem opaque or misunderstood then the oversight responsibility requires action, ex ante. 
It is hard to imagine a regulatory error ex ante exceeding the ex post costs of a calamity. 
There will of course be headlines in the financial press, questions in the legislatures about 
state interference. However, markets left to adjust on their own do from time to time err. 
This has been the history of finance. Of course market participants and regulators will 
worry about stifling innovation and competition. But this has all been heard before. The 
answer to the question: were we better off before the financial engineers got hold of 
subprime mortgages or ABCP and turned them into CDOs and CDSs is obvious.  
 
The familiar argument that severe sanctions would stifle innovation cannot be accepted 
anymore. We have known for a long time what doesn’t work – its time to approach the 
regulation of finance by regulating the regulators – not repeating the “solutions” that have 
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